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Standardized testing has become a prominent tool used to hold public schools 
accountable for student achievement. No Child Left Behind (2002) scaled-up test-based 
accountability nationwide with its core requirements challenging schools to meet reading and 
math proficiency targets or face punitive and corrective actions. Studies have examined the 
perverse effects of accountability, finding that accountability pressure has incentivized schools to 
game the accountability system in an effort to increase school performance.  
Amongst the expansive gaming literature, no studies to date have considered alternative 
school transferals as a potential avenue for gaming. Over the past two decades, alternative school 
enrollment has grown disproportionately compared to enrollment growths in regular schools and 
reports on enrollments indicate that the current demand for these schools exceeds the supply. 
This study asked whether alternative school enrollment growths are another possible unintended 
consequence of test-based accountability as “at risk” students may be transferred out of 
traditional public schools into alternative schools in an effort to meet testing targets. I use 
Comparative Interrupted Time Series modeling to assess the impact of NCLB on alternative 
school enrollment using varying degrees of accountability in states pre-NCLB to sort states into 
treatment and comparison groups. I find that the most significant impact of NCLB on enrollment 
is seen in the years following enactment with accountability pressure attributed to a 6 to 8 
percent growth per year in enrollment. However, this finding is sensitive to the inclusion of out-
of-school suspensions as a control. Additional analyses reveal that out of school suspensions may 
be an intermediate pathway through which students are sent into alternatives. With these findings 
I suggest that policymakers should look to revising accountability systems to hold regular public 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) passing with bipartisan support in 2001, emphasized 
standardized testing performance as a mechanism for holding public schools accountable for 
student achievement. This nationwide push for school accountability was brought forward by a 
desire to measure performance in the public sector and supported by student achievement gains 
in states that adopted accountability systems prior to the law’s passage. NCLB required annual 
testing in reading and mathematics for all students enrolled in public schools in grades 3 to 8 and 
at least once during high school. With NCLB’s aim to improve the achievement of all students 
and reduce the educational achievement gap, schools were required to report disaggregated test 
results for racial and ethnic minorities, English learners, and students with special needs. In 
addition to reporting test score data, schools were called to meet reading and mathematics 
performance targets for the school as a whole and for each student subgroup. Schools that failed 
to meet annual testing targets, or adequate yearly progress, were identified for improvement and 
faced various corrective actions. These corrective actions ranged from offering parents other 
school choices to school turnover, or state takeover for schools that failed to meet performance 
targets for five consecutive years (NCLB, 2002). NCLB was replaced by the Every Student 
Succeeds Act (ESSA) in 2015. Under ESSA, states are granted more flexibility in how they hold 
schools accountable for student achievement although testing requirements remain and test 
scores must be included in states’ accountability systems.  
This expansion of test-based accountability along with its consequences for 
underperformance places considerable weight on schools to focus on student test performance. A 
desirable consequence of these accountability systems and one presumably sought after by 
policymakers is for schools to use this performance feedback to pinpoint subjects and student 
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groups needing specialized attention. This has been supported by studies which show that some 
schools and districts have responded to accountability by increasing instructional supports and 
professional development for teachers in low performing schools, paying greater attention to 
student engagement, and increasing per pupil expenditures (Dee & Jacob, 2010; Hannaway & 
Stanislawski, 2005). 
But, studies have also shown that test-based accountability pressure has shaped school 
behavior in arguably perverse ways. In order to meet standardized test score targets and 
performance standards, schools and districts have been found to manipulate or “game” student 
performance through various approaches. Studies have shown schools gaming accountability 
systems by increasing special education placements for low-performers, discharging students 
without diplomas, disproportionately suspending low performing students during the 
standardized testing periods, and cheating- changing student responses on scantrons before 
computerized scoring (Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Heilig & Darling-Hammong, 2008; Figlio, 2006; 
Sadler & Cohen-Vogel, 2017).  
Though research has broadly documented the impacts of test-based accountability on the 
behavior of schools and district personnel, no studies in peer-reviewed literature to date have 
looked at student transferals to alternative schools as a potential avenue for gaming. The 
enrollment of students in alternative schools, or schools which educate students who have been 
identified as academically and/or behaviorally at risk has exceeded the growth rate of student 
enrollment in regular public schools, growing in enrollment by 271% from 1990 to 2014 
compared to regular public school enrollment which grew only 21% over the same timespan 
(NCES, 2016). Additionally, the latest national survey of alternative schools reports that one-
third of districts surveyed were unable to enroll new students in these schools due to staffing or 
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space limitations which indicates that the demand for alternative schools exceeds the current 
supply. Studies examining potential drivers of this growth are limited. Particularly, no studies 
have explored whether the test-based accountability brought forward under No Child Left 
Behind is causally related to growths in the number of students enrolled in alternative schools, 
presenting a critical gap in both the literature on alternative schooling and that on the impacts of 
accountability on school behavior.  
Brief Background on Alternative Education in the United States 
Understanding the present-day context of alternative schooling as a potential avenue for 
gaming calls for an examination of the evolution of alternative schooling from an educational 
choice model to schools that enroll students who have been deemed at-risk of educational failure. 
Alternative education in the United States emerged in the 1960’s as an educational choice model 
and a schooling alternative for students of color attending under-resourced traditional public 
schools. Alongside these schools, other alternative schools emerged with the ideas that the 
education received in traditional public schools was inadequate for student development and 
stifled creativity and learning. These schools took many forms including freedom schools, 
multicultural schools, open schools, and magnet schools. Apart from magnet schools, the 
popularity of these schools decreased and the 1980’s saw a rise in the number of structured, 
remedial alternative schools which emphasized teaching the basics to disruptive and failing 
students (Lange & Sletten, 2002; Atkins & Bartuska, 2010). Alternative education today has not 
strayed far from this model with many states creating alternative schools and programs for 
students deemed academically and behaviorally at-risk.  
As the prevalence of alternative schools grew, three classifications of these schools 
emerged (Raywid, 1994). Type I alternative schools serve a large variety of students including 
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those needing a more challenging curriculum. Students opt-in to Type I schools and the most 
popularized form of Type I schools are magnet, charter and experienced focused schools. Type II 
schools focus on academic remediation and discipline where students do not typically choose to 
attend, but are instead referred from a base school. At these schools a limited curriculum is 
offered with a focus on teaching the basics. Type III schools target specific student populations 
and offer counseling, access to social services, and academic or social remediation. Like Type I 
schools some Type III programs let students opt in (i.e. schools catering to students who had 
previously dropped out and decided to return to school). This alternative school typing guide 
exists as an overview of alternative education classifications, but schools classified as alternative 
do not always fall neatly into these categories and it is often difficult to distinguish Type II and 
Type III schools as some Type II schools offer counseling and social service access to students. 
The definition of alternative education used by the U.S. Department of Education encompasses 
programs classified as Type II or III as schools: 
“designed to address the needs of students that typically cannot be met in regular schools. 
The students who attend alternative schools and programs are typically at risk of educational 
failure (as indicated by poor grades, truancy, disruptive behavior, pregnancy, or similar factors 
associated with temporary or permanent withdrawal from school) (NCES, 2010, pg.1)” 
State definitions of alternative schools mirror with the national definition, using wide 
criterion to define what constitutes an alternative school and who these schools serve. A 
comparative study of alternative education programs by Carnine and Barret (2004) found that 
states were similar in their usage of “turnaround language,” noting that alternative education 
guidelines in the twelve states case-studied emphasize redirecting “at-risk” students’ lives. This 
turnaround language has been a concern for those wary of the lack of clear guidelines for who is 
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recommended to enroll in these programs. They argue that vague definitions of alternative 
education increase the probability of inequity in alternative education enrollments as it is 
difficult to distinguish programs seeking to improve the educational outcomes for enrolled 
students and those seeking to separate undesired, “at-risk” students from regular classrooms 
(Gregg, 1998).  
Alternative Education and Red Flags for “Gaming” 
There are a number of characteristics of alternative education that point to its 
susceptibility to gaming. These signs include lack of evidence-base on the efficacy of these 
programs, overrepresentation of educationally disadvantaged groups, and the discretionary 
nature of student transfers. These characteristics and practices may increase the chances that 
alternative schools are being used as a release valve for underperforming students as they can 
indicate negligence in regards to the integrity of these programs. 
The rampant growth of alternative education programs is of concern because there is no 
strong evidence-base on the efficacy of these programs. Alternative education programs vary 
widely in their practices and studies on individual programs are only generalizable to the schools 
studied. Evidence from studies of individual schools suggest that alternative education can have 
small, positive effects on student’s attitudes toward schooling, but no significant impact on 
standardized test performance or grade point average (Atkins & Bartuska, 2010). In an 
evaluation of alternative education programs in the Wake County Public School System 
(WCPSS), a large district in North Carolina, Landberg and Story (2013) found that WCPSS was 
allotting more seats for these programs without formal evaluation of the effects of alternative 
school enrollment on student achievement. In reviewing data, they found that only 27.2% of 
students enrolled in WCPSS alternative schools passed end of grade tests and that the four year 
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graduation rate for students enrolled in these programs was 60.2%. This expansion of alternative 
education without formal evaluations of student outcomes and effectiveness may also be the case 
in other states and school districts. Alternative schooling programs in California enrolled 10% of 
public high school students, and alternative schools in California similar to WCPSS, report 
relatively high dropout rates (Hill, 2007). Evaluations of alternative schooling that look at 
student achievement as an outcome find that student performance outcomes vary by site (Lange 
& Sletten, 2002; Lehr, Tan & Ysseldyke, 2009) and currently there is little research on what 
makes successful programs stand apart from others.  
Alongside lack of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these programs are concerns 
about the enrollment demographics in alternative education programs, specifically the 
overrepresentation of students of color, low-income, and special education students. In a study of 
race and alternative schooling, Verdugo and Glenn (2006) found that the percentage of minority 
students in a school district is associated with the presence of alternative schools. They found 
that 47% of districts where racial minorities are less than one-third of the school district 
population had the presence of an alternative school whereas 76% of districts where racial 
minorities are greater than one-third of the district population had an alternative school. Looking 
at poverty concentration in a school district as a predictor of alternative school presence they 
found that high-poverty districts are more likely to have an alternative school than low-poverty 
districts. These findings match national data on alternative schools where districts more likely to 
have alternative education programs have a larger population of students of color and higher 
poverty concentrations than other districts. These districts are also more likely to have students 
enrolled in alternative education programs who receive special education services (NCES, 2010).  
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 One of the most notable characteristics of alternative schooling that point to its 
susceptibility to gaming is that the transferal of students to alternative schools is left largely to 
the discretion of teachers and administrators in a base school. A large body of research on the 
unintended consequences of accountability has focused on instances where schools have reacted 
to test-based accountability pressures by manipulating the testing pool, excluding students from 
testing who are deemed less likely to meet proficiency standards (Jacob, 2005; Figlio & Getzler, 
2002; Figlio, 2006; Leilig & Darling-Hammond, 2008). Students who attend alternative schools 
are transferred out of a regular school or a base school primarily by recommendation from school 
staff. These students are more likely to be identified as needing academic intervention, and the 
standardized testing scores reported by alternative schools fall below those of regular public 
schools (NCES, 2010). When students are transferred into an alternative school, their base school 
is no longer responsible for their test score achievement. In effect, creating a release valve for 
schools under testing pressure to exclude the test scores of high-risk students.  
The latest national study of alternative schools and programs reveal that student 
placement in alternative school settings is to a moderate or large extent based on 
recommendations from school staff. 75% of schools surveyed reported that input from school 
personnel plays a large role in student transfers. Examining the reasons students are transferred 
into alternative schools, Booker and Mitchell (2011) studied alternative school transferals in 
three large school districts in the Southwest. They found that 80% of students sent to an 
alternative school during the study period were placed due to administrative discretion meaning 
that the reasons students were being sent to the school was not based on administrative 
precedence or standards. These discretionary transfers create the possibility that administrators 
may transfer students to alternative schools due to prior test score performance or academic 
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underachievement, a red flag for gaming the accountability system through manipulating the 
testing pool by transferring underperforming students out.  
Policy Significance of Prospective Results 
This possibility that alternative school transfers could be an unintended consequence of 
test-based accountability standards guides the relevancy of this study where I will examine 
whether or not the onset of NCLB test-based accountability affects enrollment in alternative 
schools. By examining the onset of national test-based accountability standards as a potential 
driver of the growth in alternative school usage, study findings will aid policymakers in making 
informed decisions about alternative schooling, a subset of education policy that has largely been 
forgotten in discussions of educational achievement and accountability.  
The results of this study will directly impact discussions on the effects of accountability 
at the national, state, and local level. Should study findings suggest a causal relationship between 
the onset of test-based accountability and the number of students enrolled in alternative schools, 
policymakers may want to reconsider the effects of accountability on how school districts utilize 
and administer this school type. These findings may encourage district administrators and 
policymakers to reexamine protocol and policy on the transferal of students to alternative 
education setting which may address gaming behavior in schools by holding regular schools 
more accountable for student transfers to alternatives. 
Study findings showing an opposite or insignificant relationship will also have important 
implications. Findings showing that the onset of test-based accountability has not been a driver 
of alternative school enrollment may be interpreted as positive. This suggests that schools may 
not be gaming the accountability system with alternative school transferals. These findings may 
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promote an alternate course of action in regards to policies on alternative schooling. Directing 
attention toward alternative school transfers as an education practice vulnerable to malpractice 
may encourage support for future studies on the outcomes of students enrolled in these programs 
and which may address the urgent need for the development of a best-practices model for 
alternative education.  
Roadmap 
This study will focus on the following research question: what is the relationship between 
the onset of No Child Left Behind and the enrollment of students in alternative schools? Chapter 
2 will discuss extant research on the effects of test-based accountability on student achievement 
and school behavior, building the theoretical foundation for examining alternative education as a 
potential gaming mechanism. Chapter 3 will outline the study design, explaining in-depth the 
data sources and methods employed in this study. Chapter 4 will report results, describing major 
findings from the statistical model. Chapter 5 will tie together the summary of findings, discuss 










Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this literature review I will explore three main bodies of research. First, I will 
synthesize the current knowledge on the effects of test-based accountability on reading and math 
achievement which offers insight into modeling the effects of NCLB on other policy relevant 
outcomes. Second, I will discuss Campbell’s law of social decision making as a framework for 
understanding gaming behavior and will synthesize findings from studies showing gaming as an 
unintended consequence of accountability standards. I will end by discussing the extant literature 
on gaming and student transferal to alternative schools, discussing ways that the empirical design 
employed in this study will fill gaps in the existing research. 
NCLB: Effects on Reading and Math Achievement 
Studies examining the impact of No Child Left Behind on reading and math achievement 
provide key information on the national impacts of this policy on the desired outcome and 
statistical designs for examining the effects of accountability policies. Test-based accountability 
policies approached nationwide policy in stages. Before NCLB expanded test-based 
accountability nationwide, states set their own accountability standards with 45 states publishing 
school report cards, and 27 rating or identifying low-performing schools. One of the major 
studies on the impact of test-based accountability examines the effect of state-based 
accountability on student outcomes. Exploiting the varying degrees of accountability pressure in 
states before NCLB’s passage, Carnoy and Loeb (2002) constructed a “strength of 
accountability” scale defining states as “0” if they do not test students statewide or have 
statewide test performance standards and “5” if the state sanctioned and rewarded schools or 
districts based on test scores. Using federal test score data from the National Association of 
Education Progress (NAEP), as an outcome variable, Carnoy and Loeb found that an increase on 
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the strength of accountability scale by two steps predicted an improvement math performance for 
all students and showed significant improvements for Black and Hispanic students. This 
examination of the impacts of accountability before NCLB served as a launching point for 
subsequent studies examining the impact of accountability after NCLB adoption.   
One of these studies which examined the national effects of NCLB on student 
achievement was performed by Dee and Jacobs (2011) whose study design utilized the varying 
degrees of accountability in states pre-NCLB to estimate the treatment effect of NCLB’s 
enactment. Using a strength of accountability scale, they sorted states into respective treatment 
and comparison groups and compared NAEP scores. States were sorted into a treatment group if 
they had weak accountability systems before NCLB and into the comparison group if the states 
had stronger, more robust accountability systems. They argue that states with weak 
accountability systems will be treated more by the enactment of NCLB than states that had 
stronger systems before NCLB. Additionally states with strong accountability systems allow 
their model to net out other influences that affect student achievement. They found that NCLB 
generated large and statistically significant increases on 4th grade math achievement and 
moderate improvements in math achievement for 8th grade students. Results showed no reliable 
evidence for gains in reading. Further, states that had weak systems of accountability scored 
higher on the NAEP exam compared to states that already had accountability system. These 
findings on the positive effects of NCLB on math scores are corroborated in a similar study by 
Wong, Cook, and Steiner (2011) who compared NAEP scores for public schools before and after 
NCLB using private schools as a comparison group. Like Dee and Jacob (2011) they found that 
NCLB consistently improved 4th and 8th grade math scores with limited effects on reading.   
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Other studies have examined the impact of specific components of NCLB accountability. 
Most relevant to this project are studies examining the role of accountability pressure on student 
outcomes. One of the core components of the NCLB system of accountability, adequate yearly 
progress, measured whether schools were meeting performance targets for the entire school and 
student subgroups. If a subgroup (i.e. English Language Learners) did not meet progress in a 
school, adequate yearly progress was not met and schools were identified for improvement and 
as needing corrective action. Under this logic of accountability, this identification as a low-
performing school along with the threats of corrective action should incentivize school 
improvement overall, and increase attention toward subgroups who are not meeting achievement 
goals. Hemelt (2011) examines this phenomena by questioning the effects of the stigma of being 
identified a failing school on year-to-year student performance in Maryland public schools. 
Hemelt’s findings suggest that identification as a failing school appeared to negatively affect 
student performance school-wide in math and reading the following year relative to if there were 
no sanctions in place. However, study findings showed short-run improvements in reading and 
math performance in schools that failed to meet AYP due to a specific subgroup. Math 
performance for these subgroups improved, suggesting that there is a difference in the effects of 
school-wide failure in schools where majority of students fail to make progress compared to 
when schools fail to make progress due to a specific subgroup.  
Taken together, these studies suggest positive impacts of test-based accountability on 
student performance nationally, however these improvements are not distributed evenly. Study 
findings suggest significant positive effects of accountability on student math performance with 
little effect on student reading performance. Scholars suggests that this phenomenon may be 
explained by accountability improving measured achievement and not generalizable achievement 
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amongst students (Figlio & Ladd, 2015). Standardized tests, which are structured around 
curriculum may only capture subjects tested, and math instruction is typically more standardized 
than reading. Additional criticisms of this type of accountability are the usage of standardized 
testing performance to sanction schools which lack resources and leadership to respond 
productively, and the “gaming” of the testing system which has occurred as schools under 
pressure attempt to meet the mandated testing targets (Figlio & Ladd, 2015).  
Perverse Incentives and Unintended Consequences of Accountability 
Beside the literature on impacts of accountability on student achievement are numerous 
studies that examine the role testing performance pressure has played in influencing school 
behavior. School and districts under pressure for students to meet testing goals have incentive to 
“game” the testing system. In order to meet standardized test score targets, schools and school 
districts have been found to manipulate student performance and testing scores through various 
approaches. This “gaming” can be seen in various forms from changing the school lunch menu to 
increase the caloric intake of students on test day (Figlio & Winicki, 2002) to influencing the 
number of students diagnosed with ADHD to secure special testing accommodations (Bokhari & 
Schneider, 2011). Test-based accountability has also been shown to influence school personnel 
practices with Cohen-Vogel (2011) finding that to increase school test performance, principals 
use student achievement data to hire, develop, and fire teachers. Schools under testing pressure 
have also been found to cheat, with teachers discovered to have changed answers on student 
score cards in many states (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). Studies examining teacher cheating practices 
find evidence that schools under pressure to meet performance targets are more likely to cheat 
(Sadler & Cohen-Vogel, 2017; Jacob & Levitt, 2003).   
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Behind the various studies that examine gaming behavior as a result of test-based 
accountability is the question: What aspects of policies encourage people to respond in ways that 
are undesirable? In 1979, social scientist Donald T. Campbell put forward the following social 
law:  
“The more any quantitative an indicator is used for social decision-making, the more 
subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt 
the social process it is intended to monitor (pg.85).”  
Campbell (1979) gives many examples where this law can be applied, focusing on the 
ways quantitative indicators can be vulnerable to corruption when used as a metric for success or 
rewards. He first gives the example of employment offices that when evaluated on the number of 
cases handled, became less effective in servicing clients in an effort to service more clients to 
increase evaluation scores. He also gives the example of police corruption where departments 
who were evaluated and rewarded on the number of cases solved, coerced defendants to plead 
guilty to crimes that they may not have committed in an effort to gain points toward the solved 
crime rate. Campbell also applies his law to education, and discusses the corruptibility of 
achievement testing using the Texarkana performance contracting experiment as an example. In 
this experiment contractors were paid on the basis of achievement test score gains of pupils. The 
experiment found that to get the pay-off, contractors were teaching the test answers to students to 
ensure increasing achievement test scores and a large payoff. In regards to the corruptibility of 
using achievement tests to reward and sanction schools, Campbell offers the following analysis:   
“From my own point of view, achievement tests may well be valuable indicators of 
general school achievement under conditions of normal teaching aimed at general 
competence. But when test scores become the goal of the teaching process, they both lose 
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their value as indicators of educational status and distort the educational process in 
undesirable ways (pg.85).”  
Campbell’s law, which came years before the first forms of test-based accountability, 
aids in explaining gaming behavior in response to accountability and unintended consequences 
of policies like NCLB which reward and sanction schools heavily based on the results of 
quantitative test score indicators. Though gaming comes in many forms, particularly relevant to 
this project are instances where schools and districts under pressure to meet testing targets 
“game” the system by manipulating the testing pool, using various means to control which 
students sit for the exam and in which subgroup their scores and counted. This form of gaming 
has been studied across states and school districts with many studies finding that the onset of 
accountability standards and its associated pressures were causally associated with gaming 
through manipulating the testing pool.  
Within the gaming literature, schools have been found to bolster student performance by 
re-classifying students into the special education subgroup. Jacob (2004) found that after test-
based accountability policies were implemented in Chicago Public Schools, the number of 
students classified in special education increased by eight percentage points. Figlio and Getzler 
(2002) explored this phenomenon in greater detail, examining six, large, school districts in 
Florida after the adoption of Florida’s Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) and grading 
system which rated schools with grade letters using FCAT scores as a major component of 
determining school ratings. Under the FCAT accountability system, the scores of students who 
fell into certain special education categories were not counted for the school’s score. Figlio and 
Getzler tracked a cohort of students from 1991 to the 1999 adoption of the FCAT system. They 
found that the introduction of FCAT testing was associated with a more than 50 percent higher 
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rate of disability classification in the six districts studied. Examining performance data from 
schools, they found that schools threatened by low-performance were more aggressive in their 
re-classification of students. Additional analysis of demographic and test score data of students 
reveal that low-performing students were more likely to be reclassified even when taking 
socioeconomic status into consideration.  
Schools have also been found to manipulate the testing pool by retaining students in 
untested grades. Leilig and Darling-Hammond (2008) studied a large, urban, district in Texas 
called Brazos City School District (BCSD) for the purposes of the study. Texas, which adopted 
an accountability system for public schools in 1993, was believed to be a model for policy 
makers in support of NCLB. Under this accountability system, Texas used student test results to 
rate and fund schools and as a deciding factor in determining school closure. To study the 
impacts of accountability on BCSD, Leilig and Darling-Hammond tracked a cohort of 9th grade 
students over a 6 year period. Using this longitudinal data, they found evidence that BCSD was 
retaining low-performing students in 9th grade to prevent them from taking the high-stakes exam 
given to 10th grade students. After retaking 9th grade coursework along with their 10th grade 
courses, these students would advance to 11th grade without taking the high-stakes exam. Their 
findings suggest a linear relationship between retaining students in untested grades and increased 
performance on the high-stakes exams. These findings were supported by interviews with school 
personnel where qualitative findings suggest that high-stakes testing culture in Texas has caused 
principals to put “mechanisms in place” to deal with students performing below proficiency 
(Leilig & Darling-Hammond, 2008).  
Another mechanism for manipulating the testing pool to exclude student test scores 
includes disproportionately suspending low-performing students during the testing window. 
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Figlio (2006) asked whether schools have used student discipline to bolster test performance. To 
test this question, Figlio collected data on in school and out of school suspensions before and 
after the adoption of Florida’s high-stakes accountability system. When comparing test scores of 
students punished for the same incident, Figlio found that low-performing students were 
suspended more frequently than their high-performing counterparts. Although low-performing 
students are generally more likely to be punished, when compared to high-performers, Figlio 
found that this gap in punishment severity grew significantly during the testing window. 
Additionally, this disparity in suspensions was only observed for students in tested grades where 
performance mattered most. He concludes that schools on the margins of being labeled a low 
performing school may react by using student discipline to manipulate the aggregate school 
score.  
Altogether, these studies suggest that schools have responded to accountability in 
arguably unforeseen and perverse ways. From manipulating student lunch menus to suspending 
students before high-stakes testing, schools and school personnel under testing pressure have 
attempted to “game” the system. Though these studies focus on specific states and districts and 
may not be entirely generalizable to every state, the breadth and depth of the “gaming” literature 
suggests that this behavior may not be limited only to the districts studied. The variability of the 
focus of these studies also suggest that there may be mechanisms of gaming that have not yet 
been studied. This gaming behavior should concern policymakers who support the transparency 
provided from data on the performance of students and student subgroups. If significant portions 
of members of a school or student subgroup are intentionally excluded, the achievement 
information received from testing may not be as representative of the student population of 
interest as desired. Schools with manipulated data who may need interventions for improvement 
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may be overlooked which may hinder school improvement and harm student performance long-
term. Accordingly, more studies investigating potential gaming behavior should be of interest to 
policymakers as gaming may distort prior estimates of the effects of accountability and 
contribute to misconduct toward students performing below proficiency. 
Gaming, Accountability and Transferal of Students to Alternative Schools 
No peer reviewed studies to date have examined whether test-based accountability has 
altered the transferal of students to alternative schools. Since the manipulation of the testing pool 
is a common occurrence in the “gaming” literature, transferring students to alternative schools is 
another possible unintended consequence of accountability pressure.  The closest examination of 
this possibility is an investigation of alternative charter schools in Florida by the independent, 
nonprofit newsroom ProPublica. Vogell and Fresques (2017), project leads, questioned whether 
high-performing school districts in Florida were bolstering their performance by sending low-
performing students to the local alternative charter school, Sunshine High. Using federal data on 
graduation rates in this district, they found that sending students to alternative schools correlated 
with increased graduation rates for the sending schools. Examining data on how alternative 
charter schools code for reasons students leave schools, they found that students who dropped 
out of alternative schools school completely were miscoded as withdrawing to attend GED 
programs. This faulty coding bolstered alternative school graduation data, presenting an illusion 
that alternative schools have high graduation rates. Vogell and Fresques (2017) supplemented the 
data with interviews of 32 students who had attended or left Sunshine High; they found that more 
than half of the students sampled were sent to Sunshine due to academic performance. They 
conclude that these findings support the idea that alternative education is used as a release valve 
for high-performing schools to remove low performers. 
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Though this study presents compelling findings on the frequency of recoding student exit 
data and increases in graduation rates in surrounding schools, these data are only descriptive and 
cannot determine whether pressures to meet performance standards are causally associated with 
the transferal of students to alternative schools. This study is also limited in scope, because it 
only examined potential “gaming” using alternative charter schools. Although alternative charter 
schools are an important piece of the alternative school puzzle, majority of alternative schools 
nationally are administered by public school districts (NCES, 2016). Further, since the 
investigation took place in one large school district in Florida, the generalizability of these 
finding to other states is threatened. 
 With knowledge that research on the effects of NCLB on alternative schooling is limited, 
I seek to add to the extant literature by approaching this suggested relationship using a 
comparative interrupted time series quasi-experimental research design. Using this causal 
modeling I examine potential gaming behavior on a national scale, supplementing descriptive 










Chapter 3: Methodology 
 I use a comparative interrupted time series (CITS) design to estimate the causal impact of 
test-based accountability under NCLB on the enrollment of students in alternative schools. I 
employ this research design in the spirit of Dee and Jacobs (2011) who utilized a CITS design to 
estimate the impact of NCLB on national reading and math achievement. Dee and Jacobs 
exploited the varying degrees of accountability within states before NCLB to sort states into a 
treated and comparison group. The treated group of states had weak accountability systems 
before NCLB and the comparison states had accountability standards with elements similar to 
NCLB. In their application of the CITS design, the treatment effect of NCLB is the difference in 
reading and math outcomes between the treated states and comparison states while the 
comparison group netted out the effect of hard to observe factors (i.e. other educational reform, 
market conditions) that may have confounded the relationship between NCLB and student 
achievement. Similar to Dee and Jacobs’ (2011), I study the effect of NCLB at the national level 
looking instead at its effects on alternative school enrollment making a CITS approach a natural 
match for examining the relationship at hand. A key advantage to using the CITS is the ability to 
estimate the causal effect of the onset of NCLB on alternative school enrollment. This approach 
deviates from prior studies of alternative school enrollment and accountability which solely 
examine the correlation between school enrollments and the onset of NCLB (Vogell & Fresques, 
2017). Although these correlations share important descriptive findings they lack in their ability 
to infer a causal impact. This CITS design fills in the gaps where descriptive studies have not 





Selection of Treatment and Comparison Groups  
Unlike an interrupted time series (ITS) design which compares pre and post trends after 
an intervention for only a treated group, a CITS compares pre and post trends in an outcome of 
interest between a treatment and comparison group. In a CITS, the impact of the policy is 
estimated by evaluating whether the treatment group deviates from its baseline (pre-policy) trend 
by a greater amount than the comparison group. In this study, I examine whether alternative 
school enrollment in states that had weak accountability systems, and were thus “treated” by 
NCLB deviates from its pre-NCLB trends by a greater amount than alternative school enrollment 
in states that had consequential accountability systems before NCLB. A challenge with CITS as 
applied to national policy, is the selection of an appropriate comparison group. To sort states into 
treatment and comparison groups, I rely on the premise that NCLB had the strongest effect on 
states that did not have strong accountability provisions in place before its passage. Using the 
logic model outlined by Dee and Jacobs (2011), I expect that states that sanctioned and rewarded 
schools based on standardized test performance prior to NCLB serve as a logical comparison 
group since in many of states, the introduction of NCLB did not change accountability practices 
because they already had similar practices in place.  
I adopt Dee and Jacobs’ (2011) coding to identify states that had consequential, state-
based accountability practices before NCLB’s passage. Dee and Jacob’s identified states that had 
consequential accountability systems using prior studies of accountability, Education Weeks’ 
Accountability and Assessment profile, surveys of state assessment program information from 
states’ Department of Education websites and interviews with state officials to confirm the 
timing and existence of accountability policies. Using the coding, I sort states into treatment and 
comparison groups where states with consequential accountability systems before NCLB serve 
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as the control group and states without consequential accountability systems serve as the 
treatment group. In total, twenty states are in the treatment group and thirty states are in the 
control group (see Table 1 for a list of states and their categorization). 
Table 1. Comparison and Treated States for CITS 
 
Comparison Group: (states with consequential 
accountability prior to NCLB) 
Treatment Group: (states without consequential 
accountability prior to NCLB) 
Illinois (1992)                         Tennessee (2000) 









Rhode Island (1997) 




New Mexico (1998) 

































Outcome Variable  
 The outcome variable of interest is alternative school enrollment in each state. I draw 
student enrollment for alternative schools from the National Center for Education Statistics 
Common Core of Data (CCD). The CCD is the United States Department of Education’s 
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national, primary database for elementary and secondary schools and school districts. Student 
enrollment data is reported to the CCD by state education agencies and collected annually for 
each school through the Public Elementary and Secondary School Universe Survey for each state 
and the District of Columbia.  
 To identify alternative schools, I reply on the CCD school-type codes which label schools 
as regular, special education, vocational, or alternative/other. Using this coding, I draw 
alternative school enrollment for each state between the years 1992 and 2014. A successful CITS 
requires that data for the outcome of interest be available for at least four time points to establish 
a baseline trend (Somers et al., 2013). The years selected exceed this requirement and captures 
the state-based accountability and NCLB era. 1992 is ten years before NCLB’s passage and the 
year of the emergence of the first state-based accountability system [see Table 1], 2002 to 2014 
is the NCLB era where states without strong state-based accountability systems where introduced 
to test-based accountability standards.  
There are two threats to sample integrity that must be addressed before moving forward. 
One threat to measurement integrity with using CCD to isolate alternative school enrollment is 
that school type is self-reported by school districts to the CCD. Because state definitions of 
alternative school classifications vary, districts may differ in what schools are reported as 
alternative schools. CCD began auditing school type identifications in the 2007-2008 school 
year. This risks that some schools classified as regular or vocational schools may be labeled as 
alternative schools and vice versa which would result in a flawed enrollment sample. Juvenile 
Detention Centers and Schools for the Deaf and Blind are also categorized as alternative/other 
schools. I exclude enrollment data from schools entitled Juvenile Detention Facility or School for 
the Deaf and Blind to isolate student enrollment in alternative schools for “at-risk” students. 
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Apart from detention facilities and schools for the Deaf and Blind, schools coded as alternative 
will remain in the dataset and the alternative typing will be considered accurately reported data. 
The second threat to sample integrity is fluctuations in student enrollment. Student 
enrollment data for public schools is reported during the first few weeks of the school year. 
While student enrollment data for regular public schools may remain fairly constant throughout 
the school year, enrollment in alternative schools can vary widely between the first and last days 
of the academic year. Because students can be transferred into and out of alternative schools 
during the school year, enrollment numbers at the beginning of the school year may not reflect 
enrollment during the middle or ends of the year. Unless this systematically differed in the 
treatment and control group of states this would not bias estimates of the effect of NCLB, 
however it is important to keep in mind that enrollments in these schools fluctuate. Sample data 
would be strengthened by the ability to track enrollment data throughout different points of the 
school year, however in the absence of this data, enrollment numbers reported at the beginning 
of the year must be used. 
Control Variables 
 One strength of the CITS design is its ability to control for differences between the 
treatment and comparison group that may impact the outcome variable through the use of state 
fixed-effects. The comparison group of states, which operate as a control group because they 
were less treated by NCLB serve to net out the effect of hard-to-observe factors (i.e economic 
conditions, and other educational reforms) that may influence alternative school enrollment. 
While this design is able to account for time-invariant confounders, it is possible that time-




Out of School Suspensions 
 Frequency of out of school suspensions is a probable time-variant confounder and serves 
as a proxy for variations in school discipline. As alternative schools enroll students who are 
identified as academically and behaviorally at risk, an increase in out of schools suspensions 
impact alternative school enrollment by moving districts to open more seats in alternative 
schools. I use out of school suspensions to control for the zero-tolerance era variations in student 
suspensions. Zero tolerance policy was introduced in the 1980s to address weapon and drug 
possession in schools. However, many schools began using zero-tolerance approaches to other 
school issues including truancy, disrespect, and dress code (Martinez, 2009). The zero-tolerance 
era has been criticized for permitting the over-usage of school discipline and schools have moved 
to abandon the zero-tolerance approach. Alternative schools have also been used as a schooling 
option for students suspended long-term. North Carolina, for example, ruled that students 
suspended long-term must be offered access to alternative education (King vs. Beaufort County 
Board of Education, 2010). Controlling for discipline allows for the netting-out of the effect that 
variations in disciplinary policy and trends may play in influencing alternative school 
enrollment.  
 I collect data on the number of students without disabilities suspended out of school for 
each state for the available years 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2013. This out of school 
suspension count includes the total of suspensions from students who have been suspended from 
school once and those who have been suspended more than one time. These data are reported 
from the U.S. Department of Education Civil Rights Data Collection. Out of school suspensions 
for students with disabilities is not included in the Civil Rights Data for years 2000 and 2004, 
thus data for suspended students without disabilities is used to create a consistent measure. For 
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years where data is not reported, I linearly predict missing values using observed values, creating 
suspension predictions for missing years and an estimation of suspension trends for each state for 
years 1992-2014.  
Per Pupil Expenditures  
 I control for per pupil expenditures to net-out the effects of variations in funding levels 
on student enrollment in alternative schools. The amount that states spend on educational 
instruction, support services, salary, and additional educational expenditures may affect both 
how states experience accountability and the number of students enrolled in alternative schools. 
Public alternative schools operate as stand-alone schools and require funding for building 
maintenance, school staff and supplies. I expect that the amount states spend per pupil may 
impact the degree that states were impacted by test-based accountability. States with greater 
capacity to respond to accountability may be those with greater funding levels which may impact 
the ways states direct funding toward alternative schools.  
 Data on total per pupil expenditures for public primary and secondary education is 
available for each state through NCES Common Core of Data. States report per pupil 
expenditure data to the CCD. The per pupil expenditure amount is calculated by dividing total 
expenditures by total public student membership during the fall of the reported year. The 
measure excludes expenditures for equipment, non-public education, school construction, debt 
financing, and community services. I collect total expenditure data for all states 1992-2014 and 







Using the CITS design, I create the following model: 
 
Yst=β0+β1YEARt+β2NCLBt+β3(YR_SINCE_NCLB)+β4(Ts)+β5(Ts × YEARt)+β6(Ts × 
NCLBt)+β7(Ts × YR_SINCE_NCLBt)+β8(ppexpenditures)(suspensions)st+µ 
 
where YST is the outcome variable of interest and is the natural log of student enrollment 
in alternative schools (Y) in a given state (s) in a given year (t). The coefficient β0 represents the 
intercept or starting level of alternative school enrollment for the comparison group or states that 
did not adopt consequential accountability prior to NCLB. YEARt is a trend variable which 
defines the periods of measurement where YEARt-1992 takes on a value of 0 and YEARt-2014 
takes on a value of 22. The coefficient β1 measures the growth of alternative school enrollment 
for the comparison group from 1992 until the start of NCLB. NCLBt is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for observations during the NCLB era and 0 for observations before NCLB’s passage. For 
the purposes of this study, NCLB is defined as beginning in 2002. The coefficient β2 estimates 
the level shift in enrollment after the adoption of NCLB or differences in alternative school 
enrollment for the comparison group of states immediately after NCLB’s enactment. The 
variable YR_SINCE_NCLB defines the treatment period, or years following NCLB and takes on 
a value of 1 for the 2003-2004 school year which corresponds to alternative school enrollment 
percentage totals for 2003. The coefficient β3 estimates the trend of the percentage of students 
enrolled in alternative schools for the comparison group of states during the NCLB era. 
After including coefficients with variables that delineate the years of observation and 
define a treatment period for NCLB for the comparison group, I include Ts to model the effect of 
being treated by NCLB. Ts when standing alone acts as a dummy variable that is defined for 
states that had not adopted consequential accountability prior to NCLB. The coefficient β4 
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estimates the level difference in intercept, or starting gap, between student enrollment in 
alternative schools in states with and without consequential accountability prior to NCLB. Ts × 
YEARt is the interaction effect between the year of an observation and the treatment assignment. 
The coefficient β5 estimates the difference in slope between the treated group of states and 
comparison group of states prior to NCLB. TxNCLB is the interaction between treatment 
assignment and the adoption of NCLB. Β6 estimates the difference in level between the number 
of students enrolled in alternative schools within the treated states and comparison states 
immediately following the adoption of NCLB. T×YR_SINCE_NCLB is the interaction effect 
between treatment assignment and the years following NCLB adoption. B7 estimates the 
difference between the slopes of the number of students enrolled in alternative schools for the 
treated and comparison states after the adoption of NCLB. 
 Ts × NCLBt and Ts × YR_SINCE_NCLB work together to estimate the total treatment 
effect of NCLB, pinpointing the effects of being treated by NCLB at a specific year. Using this 
model, the total estimated NCLB effect for the year 2005 is β6+3 × β7. The variables 
X(ppexpenditures)(suspensions)ST include the logged vector of controls which nets out potential 
confounding effects of school discipline and per pupil expenditures on alternative school 
enrollment. B8 estimates the impact of these controls on alternative school enrollment.  
 This CITS model estimates the basic effect of being treated by NCLB on student 
enrollment in alternative schools without accounting for the effect of the years in which states 
adopted accountability standards. Dee and Jacobs (2011) suggest that the effects of NCLB may 
be more accurately measured if considered within the framework of a dosage model. A number 
of states in the comparison group adopted accountability standards within 4 years or fewer of 
NCLB enactment (see Table 1). States that adopted accountability standards closer to NCLB face 
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the possibility of being treated by NCLB more than states that adopted accountability standards 5 
or more years before NCLB was enacted. Therefore the binary definition of Ts may downwardly 
bias the effects of NCLB on alternative school enrollment.  
 This considered, one solution to this issue is to drop states from the sample which 
adopted accountability standards within a few years of NCLB enactment. However, this 
approach leaves room for bias by requiring decisions about which states to exclude and what 
years are considered too close to the enactment of NCLB. A stronger alternative and that used by 
Dee and Jacobs (2011) is to redefine Ts as the number of years that a state went without prior 
consequential accountability between the 1992-1993 academic year and the adoption of NCLB. 
Under this approach Ts would be highest for states that had no accountability whatsoever prior to 
the onset of NCLB (i.e. 10) and smallest for Illinois who implemented its state-based 
accountability during the 1992-1993 school year (i.e. 0). Under this approach, the effect of 
NCLB is grows larger as the value of Ts grows. Using a dosage model, the total estimated NCLB 
effect on alternative school enrollment can be estimated taking into account both when a state 
introduced accountability the effect of NCLB on enrollment at a specific year. For example, the 
estimated impact of NCLB as of 2010 corresponding to a state that adopted accountability 
standards in 2000 is β6 + 64 × β7, assigning a larger NCLB effect than the binary model since the 
state adopted accountability closer to NCLB enactment. I will discuss results from modeling the 
treatment effect as binary and as a dosage model in the Results section that follows my 
discussion of threats to internal validity.  
Threats to Internal Validity  
 For this CITS, internal validity is compromised if a determinant of alternative education 
enrollment varied with the onset of NCLB and uniquely in either the treatment or comparison 
34 
 
group of states. To check for systematic bias, I run a regression analysis using the CITS equation 
where the dependent variable of interest is the effect of the onset of NCLB on time-variant 
predictors of alternative school enrollment: per-pupil expenditures and out of school suspensions. 
This will estimate the effect of NCLB’s enactment on these measures and provide evidence on 
whether these factors systematically varied between states with the onset of the policy. I find that 
out of school suspensions (p=.660) and per pupil expenditures (p=.836) did not vary significantly 
between the treated and comparison states with the onset of NCLB suggesting that the analysis 















Chapter 4: Results 
General Findings 
 Findings suggest that the initial adoption of NCLB had little effect on the enrollment of 
students in alternative schools. Both models, one which measures the treatment effect as binary 
and the other which measures it as continuous, suggest that effects of NCLB on alternative 
school enrollment at the adoption year is insignificant (p=.96 and p=.45). The standard CITS 
model and CITS analyses which control for the effects of per pupil expenditures suggest that 
NCLB accountability pressure had the greatest impact on alternative school enrollment in the 
years following NCLB adoption. For these models, the estimated effect of being treated by 
NCLB in the years following enactment is significant in the dosage model (p=.03 and p=.025) 
and approaches significance in the non-dosage model (p=.12 and p=.105). These models suggest 
that accountability pressure is casually attributed to a 6 to 8 percent increase in alternative school 
enrollment per year. This relationship is sensitive to the inclusion of out of school suspensions as 
an additional control, motivating further analysis on the role of out of school suspensions in 
transfers to alternatives. Analyses suggest that out of school suspensions may be an intermediate 
pathway through which students are sent into alternatives 
NCLB Adoption and Effects During NCLB Era 
Regression analyses for both models suggest that the most significant impact of 
accountability pressure from NCLB occurred in the years following adoption. No significant 
NCLB effect is observed at the adoption of the policy (2002) across all regressions, and impacts 
of NCLB-era accountability pressures are seen most significantly in the years following 
enactment. Results are reported from modeling the treatment effect as a non-dosage and dosage 
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model. The non-dosage model assigned states to treatment and comparison groups on the basis 
of whether or not a state had accountability standards before NCLB’s enactment and the dosage 
model assigned a treatment effect to states based on the number of years that a state went without 
accountability standards. The dosage models may provide more plausible estimates of the 
treatment effect because it takes into account the degree to which a state may be treated by 
NCLB. This model takes into account a state’s capacity to respond to accountability, suggesting 
that states adopting accountability closer to NCLB enactment (i.e. 2000) are treated by the policy 
more than states which adopted accountability ten years before NCLB’s passage (i.e. 1992). 
CITS analysis without the inclusion of control variables (Model 1) suggests that at 
enactment of NCLB, alternative school enrollment declined approximately four percent in the 
non-dosage model (p=.80) and .4 percent per the number of years that a state went without 
accountability in the dosage model (p=.86). In the years following adoption, the non-dosage 
model suggests that alternative school enrollment grew 3.5 percent per year (p=.13) due to the 
impacts of accountability pressure from NCLB. The dosage model suggests enrollment grew .84 
percent per year, for each year that a state went without accountability (p=.03). Using the dosage 
analysis to analyze the impact of NCLB for states which adopted accountability in 1999, 
modeling predicts a 6% growth in enrollment due to accountability pressures.  
Controlling for per pupil expenditures in the second multivariate regression (Model 2), 
marginally increases the magnitude of the yearly treatment effect. Using this model, the growth 
rate of alternative school enrollment due to the impact of NCLB accountability pressure is 
approximately 4 percent per year for the non-dosage model and .9 percent per year for each year 
that a state went without accountability for the dosage model. For both models, the values are 




Notes: Output and Controls are Logged Variables 
***p<.001; **p<0.05;*p<.1 (P-Values in Parenthesis) 
Estimations include state fixed-effect
Table 2. The Estimated Effects of NCLB on Alternative School Enrollment 
 
                              Non-Dosage Model                                                                                Dosage Model 
                                                                            Ts=no prior accountability                                                 Ts=years without prior school accountability  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Enrollment growth for 
comparison states until NCLB 
adoption 
 
Level shift in enrollment at 
NCLB adoption for comparison 
states  
 
Enrollment trends during NCLB 
era for comparison states  
 
Level difference in intercept 
between treatment and 
comparison states  
 
Difference in enrollment growth 
between treated and comparison 
states until NCLB adoption 
 
 
Level difference between treated 
and comparison states at NCLB 
adoption 
 
Difference in growths in 
alternative school enrollment 
during NCLB era  
 
Per Pupil Expenditures 
 
 






         
0.0975*** 0.109*** 0.0963***  0.125*** 0.138*** 0.106**  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.001)  
        
        
-0.0330 -0.0190 -0.0575  -0.0770 -0.0670 -0.214  
(0.712) (0.833) (0.549)  (0.688) (0.727) (0.334)  
        
-0.130*** -0.135*** -0.120***  -0.176*** -0.183*** -0.146***  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
        
-0.299 -0.294 -0.0389  -0.0881 -0.0877 -.0638  
(0.576) (0.571) (0.931)  (0.337) (0.325) (0.445)  
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that accountability pressure under NCLB had the most significant effect on alternative school 
enrollment following NCLB enactment.  
Including out of school suspensions within the multivariate model (Model 3) reduces the 
significance of the estimated yearly treatment effect for the non-dosage and dosage models. 
Controlling for per pupil expenditures and out of school suspensions, the effects of 
accountability pressure are found to be insignificant with pressure associated with an increase in 
alternative school enrollment of 2.5 percent per year for the dosage model (p=.322) and .5 
percent per year for year each that a state went without accountability for the non-dosage model 
(p=.274).  The lack of significance of these estimates render two plausible hypotheses: 
1. Out of school suspensions confound the relationship between accountability pressure 
and alternative school enrollment, being an alternative and more plausible 
explanation for changes in alternative school enrollment  
2. Out of school suspensions work as an intermediate or pathway mechanism, working 
between accountability pressure and alternative school enrollments 
Pathway Mechanism: Suspensions, Accountability Pressure, and Enrollments 
 Analyses suggests that accountability pressure may work through out of school 
suspensions as a pathway through which students are sent into alternatives. To test for whether 
an intermediate effect exists, I use the CITS model to predict the impact of accountability 
pressure on out of school suspensions. I find that accountability pressure significantly increased 
the percentage of students suspended out of school in a pattern that mirrors the effects of 
accountability pressure on alternative school enrollment. At the initial adoption of NCLB, 
accountability pressure had an insignificant impact on suspensions for the non-dosage and 
39 
 
dosage models (p=.558 and p=.385, respectively). However, accountability pressure has a 
significant impact on the number of students suspended out of school in the years following 
NCLB adoption. For the non-dosage model, accountability pressure is associated with a 6 
percent increase per year in the number of students suspended out of school (p=.00) and a 1 
percent increase per year in the number of students suspended out of school for each year that a 
state went without accountability for the non-dosage model (p=.00).  
 To take the analysis a step further, I run a Pearson’s Correlation Test, to test the linear 
correlation between alternative school enrollment and out of school suspensions. The correlation 
analysis suggests that out of school suspensions and alternative school enrollment are 
moderately, positively correlated (r=.55). Findings from the CITS and Pearson’s Correlation 
analyses render support for the idea that accountability pressure may influence school behavior, 
causing schools to alter disciplinary patterns by suspending students out of schools and into 











Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The Impact of NCLB on Alternative School Enrollment 
The purpose of this project was to explore the relationship between the onset of NCLB 
and the enrollment of students in alternative schools. Using prior studies of gaming and 
Campbell’s social theory as a foundation for my hypothesis, I predicted that the onset of NCLB 
was in large-part a driver of alternative school enrollment growths as schools may game the 
testing system by transferring “at-risk” students out of regular schools and into remedial 
alternatives. I used a CITS design to retrospectively study the impact of NCLB, comparing 
alternative school enrollment trends for states that had test-based accountability only after 
NCLB’s adoption to those which adopted their own state-based accountability systems prior to 
the law’s passage. This designation of the treatment and comparison groups netted out the 
impacts of unobserved factors that may influence enrollment. Further, the national focus of this 
project makes the study findings highly generalizable to the effects of NCLB in the United 
States. 
A series of CITS analyses revealed that the initial adoption of NCLB had at most a small 
impact on the enrollment of students in alternative schools. Across all regressions, differences in 
enrollment between the treatment and comparison group at the point of adoption (2002) was 
insignificant (p>.1).. Analyses of the effects of NCLB post-adoption (2003 to 2014) provide 
estimates of the effects of NCLB-era accountability pressure during the time-span of the policy. 
Looking at the effects of NCLB in the years following its adoption, analyses reveal that 
accountability pressure significantly increased the percentage of students enrolled in alternative 
schools. Further analysis reveals that this relationship may work through out of school 
suspensions as students may be suspended out of schools into alternatives due to accountability 
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pressure.  Thus, study findings rendered support for the hypothesis that NCLB has impacted the 
utilization of alternative schools as well as added a nuanced perspective as to the ways that 
gaming behavior may be carried out.  
Study Limitations 
Limited Explanatory Power 
 NCLB-era accountability policies explained a small degree of variations in alternative 
school enrollment. With the CITS modelling controlling for state-level per pupil expenditures 
and out of school suspensions, No Child Left Behind explained only 15 to 17 percent of 
variations in alternative school enrollment. These explanatory values reduces the ability to 
conclude whether or not NCLB explains alternative school enrollment growths as better 
predictors may exist to explain why enrollment has grown disproportionately over the past two 
decades.  
Enrollment Data 
 The dependent variable of interest for this study was student enrollment in alternative 
schools. This data is reported yearly by school districts to NCES at the start of the school year. 
This timing of data reporting is a challenge to the study of alternative school enrollment 
variations, because students are transferred between regular schools and alternative schools 
throughout the school year. This study would be strengthened by the ability to track enrollment 
at the beginning middle and ends of school years. Similar to Figlio (2006) who studied 
suspension patterns leading up to the testing period, I predict that alternative school transferals 
may increase significantly as the school year comes closer to the testing window. Data reported 
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at the beginnings of school years do not allow for the examination of these variations and limit 
the ability to track potential gaming behavior.  
Context of Testing Pressure 
 Testing performance is a component of responses to accountability. The CITS modeling 
used for this study assigned a treatment effect to states based on whether or not a state went 
without accountability prior to NCLB. Testing performance and timing of adoption may work 
together as determinants of state responses to accountability. This model would be strengthened 
by taking state-performance into account as an additional indicator of the degree to which a state 
may be under accountability pressure alongside the year that accountability went into place to 
isolate the effect of NCLB. If a state, for example, adopted accountability during the NCLB era 
but schools within the state met performance standards, NCLB may have little impact on the way 
the states manage alternative school enrollment. Moving forward, contextualizing state 
performance alongside timing of policy enactment may prove effective in studying responses to 
accountability pressure.  
Suggestions for Future Research 
 Study findings provide a foundation for other projects to examine accountability systems 
and alternative schooling. First, this CITS model could be replicated to compare enrollment 
trends during NCLB between states that had strong systems of regulation for alternative school 
transfers and those which do not. This CITS analysis may add an additional layer to the research, 
examining whether alternative school regulations may affect enrollment patterns.  
  My second suggestion comes from findings from the CITS model. Modeling found that 
out of school suspensions significantly correlate with student enrollment in alternative schools. 
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In attempting to identify drivers of alternative school enrollment, examining school discipline 
patterns as a potential driver of enrollment may provide additional answers to the question of 
why enrollment in these schools has grown significantly over the past twenty years. Studying the 
impact of factors like suspension patterns may lead to solutions for regulating alternative school 
enrollment. As suspensions decisions occur at the school-level, this research may inform 
preventative practices which can reduce the transferal of students into alternative schools. 
 My last suggestion for future research is a continuation of the CITS model to examine 
trends in alternative school enrollment after the enactment of The Every Student Succeeds Act 
(ESSA) law which replaced NCLB in 2015. Under ESSA, the power has shifted from the federal 
government to the states where states in large-part must recreate their own accountability 
systems. A compelling project may compare enrollment patterns between states that kept 
accountability policies and sanctions similar to those under NCLB to states that implemented 
more lenient accountability policies. This project would be a look to the future as the landscape 
of accountability is being shaped by state governments and may impact the enrollment of 
students in alternative schools. 
Policy Implications 
 This study found a potential causal link between the onset of NCLB and the enrollment 
of students in alternative schools. Given these findings, policymakers must consider ways to 
reduce possibilities of gaming behavior. One potential solution to this issue is to hold sending 
schools more accountable for alternative school transfers and the outcomes of students in these 
schools after transferal.  
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Further, alternative school enrollment is expanding with little information on student 
outcomes or best-practices for academic and behavioral interventions. Thus, policymakers at the 
federal level should provide funding supports for research focused specifically on examining the 
outcomes and experiences of students enrolled in alternative schooling programs to provide 
suggestions to states for a best-practices model for alternative education.  
Lastly, research is needed beyond student outcomes on the social effects of separate 
schooling for “at-risk” youth. This research would identify whether there are practical 
alternatives to alternative schools that would reduce the social separation of “at-risk” youth from 
regular schools. To fully understand alternative schools and best steps moving forward, better 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Treated States [States With No Accountability Prior to NCLB] 





 6403.68 9382.49  
Total School Enrollment  523196 474723.3  
Out of School Suspensions  28159.34 30959.67  
Per Pupil Expenditures  8546.39 3510.43  
     
 
Comparison States [States with Accountability Prior to NCLB] 





 9546.79 14990.1  
Total School Enrollment  1086094 946743  
Out of School Suspensions  69395.42 54459.13  
Per Pupil Expenditures  8347.07 3005.54  
 





Table 4. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient  
Correlation Between Alternative School Enrollment and Out of School Suspensions 
 
 Alternative School Enrollment Out of School Suspensions 
Alternative School Enrollment 1.0000  
Out of School Suspensions 0.5491 1.0000 
 
Output are logged values* 
 







Notes: Output and Controls are Logged Variables 
***p<.001; **p<0.05;*p<.1 (P-Values in Parenthesis) 
Estimations include state fixed-effects
Table 2. The Estimated Effects of NCLB on Out of School Suspensions 
 
                              Non-Dosage Model                                                             Dosage Model 
                                                                            Ts=no prior accountability                             Ts=years without prior school accountability  
 Model 1 Model 1 Model 3  Model 1 Model 1 Model 3  
Out of School Suspension growth 
for comparison states until NCLB 
adoption 
 
Level shift in suspensions at 
NCLB adoption for comparison 
states  
 
Suspension trends during NCLB 
era for comparison states  
 
Level difference in intercept 
between treatment and 
comparison states  
 
Difference in suspension growth 
between treated and comparison 
states until NCLB adoption 
 
 
Level difference between treated 
and comparison states at NCLB 
adoption 
 
Difference in growths in Out of 
School Suspensions during 






0.0975*** 0.0365*** 0.0963***  0.125*** 0.0973*** 0.106**  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.001)  
        
        
-0.0330 0.0192 -0.0575  -0.0770 0.0506 -0.214  
(0.712) (0.67) (0.549)  (0.688) (0.727) (0.334)  
        
-0.130*** -.0616*** -0.120***  -0.176*** -0.1235*** -0.146***  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
        
-0.299 -.8615** -0.0389  -0.0881 -0.0113 -.0638  
(0.576) (0.015) (0.931)  (0.337) (0.086) (0.445)  














(0.225) (0.00) (0.588)  (0.119) (0.00) (0.559)  




















(0.803) (0.385) (0.960)  (0.864) (0.558) (0.457)  














(0.126) (0.00) (0.322)  (0.031) (0.00) (0.274)  












        
 .24 0.103 
(0.136) 
  .20 0.130* 
(.069) 
 
        
